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Abstract 
The Effects of Board Diversity on Firm Risk 
Omar Shalhoub 
 
This study aims to determine the combined effects of board diversity in terms of board 
member age, gender and educational level on firm risk. Composite diversity indices, constructed 
from a combination of Blau (1977) and Shannon (1948) heterogeneity measures respectively, 
reflecting each board’s composition with respect to the three aspects, are employed for a sample 
of 3,513 US non-financial and non-utility firms for the years between 2000 and 2017.  
The results indicate that both gender and educational diversity amongst board members 
reduce firm systematic and total risk, measured as a firm’s beta and annualized stock return 
volatility respectively. However, age heterogeneity does not significantly affect firm risk. 
Additionally, the combined effect of all three diversity aspects as a whole, estimated by the 
composite diversity indices, is found to be negatively related to firm risk suggesting that a firm’s 
risk tends to decrease as a function of the overall diversity of its board members. Moreover, in 
high financial volatility periods, larger dissimilarity levels amongst board members reduce firm 
risk at a lower rate than that noticed under normal market conditions. Therefore, the net effect of 
board diversity is found to be significantly lower during more volatile market conditions. This 
suggests that boards fail to accommodate their risk decisions to fluctuating market conditions. 
This could also be an indication of an increase in inter-member conflicts and disagreements, 
making it more difficult for boards to agree on business decisions thus reducing the level of risk 
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1. Introduction 
The effect that the diversity of firms’ Boards of Directors has on performance, value and 
risk is a highly controversial topic in Finance which was investigated by many researchers in the 
late twentieth century. This topic later became the focus of many research papers following an 
increase in the popularity of Robinson and Dechant’s (1997) value-in-diversity proposition and 
the pressures to incorporate diversity on corporate boards (Daily & Dalton, 2003; Ruigrok, Peck 
& Tacheva, 2007). 
Recent developments in corporate governance research portray an increase in the amount 
of studies investigating the role and composition of boards of directors. However, a lack of 
evidence on the effects of the demographic composition of boards still exists. Additionally, the 
majority of existing scholarly articles fail to account for the consequences of the interaction 
amongst board members with differing characteristics (Giannetti & Zhao, 2016).  
The widening of the candidate pool available to businesses caused by the world’s varying 
demographic composition, legislative changes and cultural developments, ultimately leading to 
an increase in workplace diversity, justifies the need for a better understanding of this 
phenomenon from a business perspective. 
Contemporary trends in The United States point to an increase in firm board member 
diversity (Chen, Gramilch & Houser, 2017). The 2020 Women on Boards Gender Diversity 
Index Report (2018) indicates that the percentage of Fortune 1000 firms where women make up 
20% or more of the board of directors’ seats grew from 29% in 2011 to 62% in 2018. For S&P 
500 firms, 87% reported having at least two or more females on their boards in 2018, up from 
56% in 2008. However, the report also shows that women are still under represented on US 
corporate boards as they occupied only 22% and 21.2% of the board seats of Fortune 1000 and 
S&P 500 firms respectively in 2018.  
Several European countries including Germany, France and Belgium have already enacted 
legislative quotas pertaining to the percentage of women on the boards of publicly traded 
companies. California was the first US state to enforce a similar regulation on publicly traded 
firms in September 2018. Furthermore, Fortune’s (2016) report outlines that female US firm 
board members tend to be younger than their male counterparts, while 45% of female directors 
are younger than 60. Additionally, the World Bank (2018) provides compelling statistics 
reflecting higher university graduation rates and higher total years of education amongst females. 
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In fact, in the US, women’s educational achievements have surpassed those of men since the 
1980s, and in the twenty-first century, the number of female board members holding Bachelor’s, 
Master’s and Doctor’s degrees is significantly larger than their male counterparts (Snyder & 
Dillow, 2011). Consequently, this reflects how current trends are successfully capable of 
changing board compositions thus altering firm corporate outcomes. 
Theories hypothesize that top management team diversity could enhance the efficiency of 
the decision making processes resulting in better quality strategic decisions and increased 
creativity and innovation levels. These consequences are likely to affect corporate outcomes 
including firm value and risk taking. Contrarily, other theories propose that board heterogeneity 
could lead to increased conflicts and communication problems amongst board members, 
hindering group dynamics and decision making processes thus adversely affecting corporate 
performance (Carter, Simkins & Simpson, 2003; Giannetti & Zhao, 2016). In fact, Milliken and 
Martins (1996) argue that “diversity appears to be a double-edged sword, increasing the 
opportunity for creativity as well as the likelihood that group members will be dissatisfied and 
fail to identify with the group” (p.403).  
On the other hand, an increase in board heterogeneity may also be attributed to moral and 
political reasons and management’s efforts to reduce discrimination and promote equality and 
fairness in the workplace in an effort to improve the firm’s public image (Erhardt, Werbel, & 
Shrader, 2003). 
Researchers suggest that the group characteristics of boards of directors are likely to alter 
individual directors’ efforts ultimately affecting firm corporate performance and risk (Berger, 
Kick & Schaeck, 2014). However, existing empirical studies have arrived at inconclusive and 
conflicting results with regards to the relationship between board diversity and firm performance 
and risk as some report positive effects while others conclude the presence of negative or 
insignificant outcomes.  
This study aims to determine the effects of board diversity in terms of board member age, 
gender and educational level on firm risk using panel regression analysis while controlling for 
factors commonly known to affect firm risk levels. Composite diversity indices, constructed 
from a combination of Blau (1977) and Shannon (1948) heterogeneity measures respectively, 
reflecting each board’s composition with respect to the three aspects, are employed for a sample 
of 3,513 US non-financial and non-utility firms for the years between 2000 and 2017.  
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Relying on social psychology’s social identity theory, which postulates that people from 
diverse cultures, educational backgrounds and experiences portray divergent preferences, 
perspectives and beliefs, hindering their ability to communicate with each other, this paper 
believes that increased board member divergence would enhance the probability of having more 
conflicts and communication problems between board members. This, in turn, is expected to 
diminish the cohesiveness of business decisions and make it harder for board members to agree 
on risk choices, emphasizing the need for compromises, thus agreeing on less risky business 
decisions, decreasing the level of risk taken on by firms and reducing their overall volatility.  
The results indicate that both gender and educational diversity amongst board members 
reduce firm systematic and total risk, measured as a firm’s beta and annualized stock return 
volatility respectively. However, age heterogeneity does not significantly affect firm risk. 
Additionally, the combined effect of all three diversity aspects as a whole, estimated by the 
composite diversity indices, is found to be negatively related to firm risk suggesting that a firm’s 
risk tends to decrease as a function of the overall diversity of its board members. Moreover, in 
high financial volatility periods, larger dissimilarity levels amongst board members reduce firm 
risk at a lower rate than that noticed under normal market conditions. Therefore, this finding 
implies that the net effect of board diversity significantly lower during more volatile market 
conditions as they fail to accommodate their risk decisions to fluctuating market conditions. This 
could also be an indication of an increase in inter-member conflicts and disagreements, making it 
more difficult for boards to agree on business decisions thus reducing the level of risk taken on 
by firms under normal market conditions. 
The findings hold under different risk measures, diversity measures and index 
compositions. Additionally, the effects are robust to endogeneity concerns as firms that are 
characterized as having high diversity levels amongst their board members exhibit lower risk 
levels, while those that demonstrate increases (decreases) in the board’s overall diversity levels 
observe decreases (increases) in their respective risk levels indicating that the risk alterations are 
as a result of the diversity variations. 
This research contributes to the existing knowledge and findings in the corporate 
governance field in various ways. Firstly, it investigates the effects of board diversity using a 
relative composite index which incorporates both observable and non-observable diversity 
aspects thus enabling a better understanding of the overall consequences of board member 
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heterogeneity. Secondly, while a wide range of researchers observe the relationship between a 
single diversity attribute and firm financial performance, there is a lack of evidence on the 
combined effect of differing attributes on the firm’s risk level. Thus this research provides 
compelling evidence on the relationship between the overall level of board diversity and firm 
risk, an aspect that has not been addressed in previous empirical studies, and also has several 
implications for current and future investors and employees. Thirdly, this study helps settle the 
disputes and inconsistencies amongst the conflicting findings of a growing body of literature 
which explores the consequences of board member heterogeneity.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a definition of 
diversity, describes the roles of board members as corporate governance mechanisms, and 
highlights the theoretical frameworks used to explain the effects of board diversity on firm 
corporate outcomes. It also outlines the advantages and disadvantages of board member 
heterogeneity and discusses the findings of prior empirical papers used to develop this study’s 
hypotheses. Sections 3 and 4 describe the research design including the data-gathering process 
and the methodology used to test the hypotheses respectively. The empirical findings are 
analyzed in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes by providing practical implications, 
discussing the limitations of this research and specifying recommendations for further work.  
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 What is Diversity? 
Diversity in the board of directors could be defined as a variety in the board of director’s 
composition in terms of any characteristics that members can use to differentiate other members 
from themselves (Phillips & O’Reilly, 1998; Mahadeo, Soobaroyen & Hanuman, 2012). These 
characteristics could either be observable, based on demographic aspects such as gender, age, 
nationality and race, or non-observable, based on cognitive aspects such as level of education, 
educational field, professional experiences, cultural values and personality traits (Milliken & 
Martins, 1996; Pelled, 1996; Boeker, 1997; Watson, Johnson & Merritt, 1998; Maznevski, 1999; 
Kilduff, Angelmar & Mehra, 2000; Petersen, 2000; Timmerman, 2000; Erhardt, Werbel & 
Shrader, 2003; Kang, Cheng & Gray, 2007).  
While the majority of researchers focus on the effects of observable diversity aspects on 
firm performance, this research incorporates both observable and non-observable aspects by 
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examining the effects of board members’ gender, age and education level on firm risk using a 
composite diversity index. 
 
2.2 The Role of Boards of Directors 
In public companies, shareholders elect members to the board of directors with the legal 
obligation of representing them and ensuring that management’s decisions are in their best 
interest. Boards of directors thus serve as a link between shareholder and mangers and have a 
duty to protect the organization’s assets and shareholders’ investments (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
They are responsible for assigning business leaders who would drive the organization in a 
favourable direction for shareholders, monitoring internal controls and management teams and 
serving as advisors to the managers to ensure that the decisions taken are beneficial to the 
shareholders (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). 
On the other hand, they also have the duty of setting policies to guide the top management 
team’s actions and overseeing and influencing the business’s strategic directions. As such, they 
direct businesses by setting a vision, mission and business goals, and vote on the best strategies 
for them, altering the business’s stock market performance and risk level, and the returns for the 
shareholders (Boland & Hofstrand, 2009).  
In an attempt to mitigate firm risk, boards should establish clear guidelines and 
expectations on how they identify, evaluate, manage and adapt to critical risks and engage in risk 
management activities. They must also effectively communicate these definitions to top 
management teams through the company’s vision and mission statements, thus ensuring that 
managers are successfully able to adapt the business’s operational decisions to its risk profile. 
Monitoring and reviewing managerial decisions through detailed risk reports would also enable 
them to ensure that managers are performing their roles as necessary which is a high determinant 
of firm risk (Deutch, 2005; Delloitte, 2014). 
Hence, directors could mitigate firm risk by promoting strong risk management behaviours 
within the business, rewarding people for managing and mitigating risk and allocating resources 
and funds to risk management programs. Additionally, they could ensure that all directors 
engage in decision making and strategic processes. They should also establish whether they have 
the necessary skills and competencies to thoroughly evaluate strategic decisions from different 
perspectives and incorporate the associated strategic risks in their decisions. This could be 
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achieved by nominating a diverse candidate pool and providing professional development 
programs to existing executives thus benefiting from their varying skills and experiences (Ernst 
& Young, 2013).  
 
2.3 The Theoretical Frameworks of Firm Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance refers to the system that controls and directs firms (Campbell & 
Mínguez-Vera, 2008). Economic theories assume that boards of directors have various important 
internal responsibilities and serve as vital corporate governance mechanisms in larger 
corporations (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Rose, 2007).  
The majority of Economics and Finance research papers base their arguments pertaining to 
the relationship between the board of director’s diversity and firm value, performance and risk 
on the agency theory while other papers support their findings with the resource-based, human-
capital and social-identity theories each of which is explained in the following three subsections 
(Carter at al., 2003).  
 
2.3.1 Agency Theory 
Developed by Ross (1973) and Mitnick (1975), the Agency Theory in finance clarifies the 
relationship between shareholders and managers in business. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
describe the agency relationship as a contract under which the principals (shareholders) authorize 
agents (managers) to make business decisions on their behalf, which are perceived to be in the 
principals’ best interests. 
Under these assumptions, boards of directors are used to regulate and monitor managers, 
with the aim of maximizing firm value in the shareholders’ interest, and to prevent managers 
from engaging in opportunistic behaviours (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Thus, boards help alleviate 
the agency problem between managers and shareholders by implementing dynamic strategic 
decisions, such as assigning mangers and deciding on their compensation levels, while 
dismissing managers that do not act in the shareholders’ best interests (Carter et al., 2003). 
However, if both the directors and the shareholders aim to maximize their own utility, 
there is ample evidence to suggest that the directors will not always act in the shareholders’ best 
interest, thus representing the presence of an agency cost (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
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On the other hand, if the agents’ utility is dependent on the firm’s value, and they aim to 
maximize their personal utility, agency theory appears to suggest that the agents would be risk 
averse (Sila, Gonzalez & Hagendorff, 2016). Therefore, agency theory suggests that it is crucial 
to ensure that directors are independent in order for them to perform their monitoring and 
controlling tasks which maximize shareholders’ value (Carter et al. 2003; Ruigrok et al., 2007).  
Carter et al. (2003) and Talavera, Yin and Zhang (2018) suggest that a more diverse board 
of directors would increase board independence as outsiders from different gender, age, race, and 
ethnicity may bring up points that other directors may not think of thus enhancing board activity 
and monitoring. However, Carter et al. (2003) emphasize that board members with differing 
perceptions might be marginalized, and, as such, they would not be able to perform their 
monitoring duties. Therefore, they argue that the “agency theory simply does not provide a clear-
cut prediction concerning the link between board diversity and firm value” (p.37).   
 
2.3.2 Resource-Based Theory and Human Capital Theory 
Barney’s (1991) Resource-Based Theory proposes that firms have several resources, which 
could be used for the implementation of value creating strategies, at their disposition. These 
include their assets, information, knowledge, social connections, organisational processes and 
firm specific attributes. Therefore, corporations should be able to utilise these resources, rather 
than the industry structure, in order to achieve a competitive advantage provided that they are 
unique to the corporation and difficult to imitate (Barney, 1991; Shrader, Blackburn, & Iles, 
1997). 
In line with Barney’s (1991) Resource-Based Theory, Becker’s (1964) Human Capital 
Theory demonstrates that the human capital of a corporation’s employees, managers and board 
members, which could be advantageous to the firm and difficult to imitate, significantly affects 
its ability to achieve a competitive advantage. These resources comprise a person’s educational 
background, skills, experiences, training, characteristics and individual knowledge and insights 
which are unique to each employee (Barney, 1991; Richard, 2000; Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, & 
Simpson, 2010; Setiyono & Tarazi, 2014; Talavera et al., 2018). 
Based on these theories, boards of directors are expected to provide firms with resources in 
the forms of human and relational capital from their knowledge, skills, experiences, and social 
ties acquired from their personal and professional lives. This could be used to gain access to 
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external sources such as funding and new opportunities thus enhancing firm performance 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Ruigrok et al., 2007; Setiyono & Tarazi, 2014). 
Accordingly, heterogeneous boards would provide firms with a broad combination of 
exclusive and valuable resources and perspectives that could be used for solving business 
problems and strategy implementation (Shrader et al., 1997; Ruigrok et al., 2007; Wellalage & 
Locke, 2013). 
 
2.3.3 Social Identity Theory 
Social identity theory assumes that people rely on the social groups they belong to, such as 
nationality, age, gender, and social class, in order to define their personalities (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979; Islam, 2014). Individuals belonging to the same social group are defined as in-group 
members, while people belonging to other social groups are considered out-group members who 
would face acceptance and integration difficulties by the in-groups. As such, “individuals prefer 
to build and maintain relationships with others who are similar to them in the social category 
membership” (Wellalage & Locke, 2013, p.120). 
Under the assumptions of the social identity theory, therefore, it is expected that an 
increase in a corporation’s board of directors’ heterogeneity may result in more clashes amongst 
in-group and out-group directors. This would impede the cohesiveness of board meetings, 
prolong the time required for the board to make decisions and hinder communication amongst 
members leading to a weakening of firm performance and reducing firm risk (Byrne, 1971; 
Phillips & O’Reilly, 1998; Westphal & Bednar, 2005; Wang & Hsu, 2013; Talavera et al., 2018).  
 
2.4 Diversity and Boards of Directors 
Compelling evidence concerning why corporations opt to increase their workplace 
diversity has been provided by Cox and Blake (1991), Robinson and Dechant (1997), Carter et 
al. (2003), Anderson, Reeb, Upadhyay and Zhao (2011) and Mahadeo et al. (2012). They argue 
that a diverse workplace would enable a corporation to develop a clearer understanding and 
stronger integration into markets which are experiencing increases in their overall diversity 
levels.  
Additionally, diverse workplaces would enable corporations to enhance their creativity and 
innovation levels and improve their problem-solving and leadership styles as they benefit from 
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the varying experiences, skills and attributes of their members. This would allow them to 
develop and thoroughly evaluate and understand business solutions, and achieve a competitive 
advantage. Finally, firms would benefit from improved international relationships as managers 
and directors develop a better understanding of other cultures based on their social interactions.  
On the other hand, Sah and Stiglitz (1991), Adams and Ferreira (2010) and Giannetti and 
Zhao (2016) explain that large and diverse groups require more time and effort to arrive at a 
consensus. Therefore, more compromises are made in their decision-making processes and their 
outcomes tend to be less extreme compared to small groups. This suggests that larger and more 
diverse boards should exhibit lower performance volatility therefore reducing firm risk (Lenard, 
Yu, York & Wu, 2014). 
Cox and Blake (1991), Cox (1991) and Richard, Murthi and Ismail (2007) justify that firms 
which fail to integrate diverse workforces would encounter significant costs as a result of higher 
absenteeism and turnover rates from unsatisfied members and slower decision making processes. 
Additionally, as boards become more diverse, it is expected that there would be an increase in 
the differences in individual values and preferences resulting in communication problems and 
disagreements amongst board members, inhibiting the decision-making process and leading to 
highly unpredictable decisions, thus increasing performance variability and firm risk (Giannetti 
& Zhao, 2016). 
 
2.5 Board Diversity and Hypothesis Development 
The following three subsections outline the effects of three diversity aspects: gender, age 
and education on firm performance, value and risk. The fourth and final subsection outlines the 
overall effects of diversity on firms based on the mixed findings of previous empirical research 
using different composite diversity indices. This serves as the basis for developing the hypothesis 
for this research and highlights the need for further research pertaining to the effects of diversity 
on firm risk. 
 
2.5.1 Gender Diversity 
The gender composition of boards of directors is the most commonly researched 
demographic factor in Finance. Several researchers study the effects of board gender diversity on 
firm value (e.g. Carter et al., 2003, 2010; Rose, 2007; Campbell & Minguez-Vera (2008); 
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Darmadi, 2013), performance (e.g. Wellalage & Locke, 2010; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Post& 
Byron, 2015) and risk (e.g. Berger, Kick & Schaeck, 2014; Lenard et al., 2014; Sityono & 
Tarazi, 2014; Loukil & Yousfi, 2016; Sila et al., 2016; Jizi & Nehme, 2017; Chen, Gramilch & 
Houser, 2017). However, their findings are inconsistent, as some document positive effects while 
others conclude negative or insignificant effects. 
From a governance perspective, researchers argue that highly gender diverse boards, 
compared to those with lower diversity levels, do a better job at monitoring management and 
accounting. They have also been shown to make better business decisions by enhancing the 
decision making process and to reflect higher ethicality in their decisions (Post & Byron, 2015; 
Chen et al., 2017). 
Additionally, Simpson, Carter and D’Souza (2010) posit that female directors are more 
likely to be independent. Therefore, gender heterogeneous boards reflect higher independence 
levels. Female directors also tend to be more conservative and risk averse than their male 
counterparts (Srinidhi, Gul & Tsui, 2011).  
On the other hand, the earnings of firms with gender diverse boards more accurately reflect 
economic performance as board gender diversity has been shown to have a positive effect on 
earnings quality and the accuracy of analyst forecasts (Srinidhi et al. 2011; Gul, Hutchinson & 
Lai, 2013; Chen et al., 2017). 
Konrad and Kramer (2006) argue that women on boards tend to take a larger selection of 
shareholders’ interests into account in their decision making processes. Therefore, diverse boards 
follow more thorough decision making processes leading to better quality decisions which would 
alter the firm’s risk (Phillips & O’Reilly, 1998; Daily & Dalton, 2003; Colaco, Myers & Nitkin, 
2011). Also, female directors have been shown to take ethical standards into consideration in 
their decision making, and to avoid being part of unethical behaviours when forced by 
corporations (Wahn, 2003; Roxas & Stoneback, 2004). These arguments thus suggest that 
corporations with gender diverse boards of directors possess lower risk levels. 
A positive relationship between board gender diversity and firm value and performance has 
been documented by Carter et al. (2003), Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) and Mahadeo et 
al. (2012) who suggest that diversity increases the quality of decisions made by boards due to a 
variety in the contributed skills and experiences. These findings also suggest that diversity 
reduces agency costs (Cater et al., 2003).  
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In line with studies documenting a positive relationship between board gender diversity 
and firm performance, Lenard et al. (2014), Loukil and Yousfi (2016) and Jizi and Nehme (2017) 
find a negative relationship between board gender diversity and firm risk amongst firms from 
three different countries: The United States, Tunisia and The United Kingdom. This suggests that 
female participation on boards enhances the fulfilment of their fiduciary duties and supports the 
arguments of the resource-based theory ultimately reducing firm risk. 
The presence of females on Indonesian bank boards of directors significantly reduces the 
banks’ risk as was reported by Setiyono and Tarazi (2014). They also provide evidence 
suggesting that the benefits of gender diversity do not outweigh the integration costs. However, 
their results are not directly translatable to other industries and countries due to regulatory 
differences.  
Conversely, Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Wellalage and Locke (2013) find a negative 
relationship between board gender diversity and Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value. Even 
though there is evidence of an increase in the monitoring of management intensity amongst the 
studied firms, the researchers attribute the negative effect to the boards’ over monitoring efforts. 
Interestingly, Darmadi (2013) finds no significant relationship between the proportion of female 
directors on the board and firm’s return on assets, but concludes that a negative relationship 
between the presence of females on boards and firm performance and value exists. However, the 
author cautions that the results should not be interpreted as evidence that the presence of female 
executives is value destroying.  
On the other hand, Chen et al. (2017) document that gender diverse boards encourage 
managers to take on more financial risks which could increase firm value while they discourage 
them from engaging in actions that could enhance reputational risks thus diminishing share 
prices. The researchers argue that this suggests that gender heterogeneous boards have a better 
understanding of firm risk compared to gender homogenous boards. However, this could also be 
an indication of the presence of communication problems and conflicts amongst board members 
where it proves to be challenging to arrive at a consensus thus reducing firm risk. 
Berger et al. (2014) also find a marginally significant positive relation between the 
proportion of female directors on German banks’ boards of directors and bank portfolio risk. 
However, Sila et al. (2016) did not find a significant relationship between female boardroom 
representation and firm risk after accounting for endogeneity, while Rose (2007) and Carter et al. 
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(2010) fail to find a significant impact of gender diversity on firms’ Tobin’s Q. Therefore, they 
conclude that the increase in female boardroom representation is a fairness matter rather than an 
economic one.   
This study expects that as boards become more gender diverse, the probability of 
encountering conflicts and communication problems between male and female executives will 
significantly increase as a result of differing characteristics, risk preferences and strategic 
priorities. This would prolong decision making processes and hinder the board’s productivity. 
However, given the higher ethicality of female decision making processes and their tendency to 
avoid the engagement in unethical behaviours especially in light of the agency relationship, these 
directors are expected to voice out their concerns thus altering the firm’s strategic decisions and 
affecting overall risk levels. Therefore, increasing board gender heterogeneity is expected to 
reduce firm risk.  
 
2.5.2 Age Diversity 
As part of investigations by many researchers in various finance papers in the early twenty-
first century, inconsistent results on the effects of board age diversity on different firm 
performance outcomes have been documented. Darmadi (2013) argues that “age could be used as 
a proxy for experience and risk-taking manner” (p.10).   
Age diversity amongst board members possibly enhances the networks, skills, knowledge 
and experiences at the board’s disposition as younger directors exhibit more creativity, recent 
skills and knowledge, while older directors have more solid experiences, networks and 
relationships thus enhancing firm performance (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1991; Talavera et al., 
2018). Firms with younger executives also exhibit higher levels of international diversification 
(Hermann & Data, 2005). Also, Wellalage and Locke (2013) argue that the average age of board 
members might affect their business decisions and the amount of risk their firms take on which 
leads them to exhibit higher financial performance.  
Hamrbick and Mason (1984) expect that firms led by younger managers would exhibit 
higher growth rates than those with older managers which could be associated with the younger 
managers’ interests in career development and willingness to live dynamic work lives (Cheng, 
Chan & Leung, 2010).      
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Board age diversity may also constitute a cost to firms due to conflicts amongst members 
belonging to different age cohorts as a result of cognitive differences and risk-appetite 
discrepancies. Younger directors exhibit higher risk preferences while older directors are more 
cautious and conservative with their decisions and resistant to change. This produces 
communication barriers amongst members and hinders firm performance (Carson, Mosley & 
Boyar, 2004; Talavera et al., 2018).   
Kim and Lim (2010) conclude a positive relationship between age diversity of independent 
directors and firm value in Korean firms. Relying on the resource-based theory, they argue that 
younger executives have higher productivity levels while those older have longer and more 
useful experiences. As such, the combination of both these attributes could create valuable 
opportunities for firms thus enhancing their performance.  
Amongst Indonesian firms, Darmadi (2013) finds that the proportion of young directors on 
the boards has a significant positive effect on firm performance. However, he fails to find a 
significant relationship between a Blau gender diversity index and Tobin’s Q, suggesting that 
young directors are highly interested in facing new and challenging tasks and strategies which 
lead to higher performance (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).    
Mahadeo et al. (2012) and Wellalege and Locke (2013) find a positive association between 
age diversity and firm performance amongst emerging countries. They argued that this could be 
explained by the division of labour due to differences in the strategic and operational 
considerations of the various generations.    
Based on the arguments of the social identity theory, Hafsi and Turgot (2013), Ali, Ng and 
Kulik (2014) and Aime and Tarus (2014) find that board age heterogeneity hampers firms’ social 
performance, profitability and decisions pertaining to strategic changes. 
Talavera et al. (2018) find that board age diversity has a significant negative effect on the 
Chinese bank profitability between the years 2007 and 2013. They argue that this is due to a 
reduction in the boardroom cohesion, causing conflicts and communication problems amongst 
directors, weakening the board’s effectiveness and hindering its ability to monitor management. 
Rivas (2012) believes that the skills and experiences of older team members would be offset by 
the risk seeking behaviours of younger members. As such, Rivas (2012) argues that higher levels 
of age heterogeneity in boards of directors would most likely provide better advice and resources 
to firms, and lead to a higher inclination to learn and take on more risk.   
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Moreover, Berger et al. (2014) document that a board change which reduces the board’s 
average age significantly increases German banks’ portfolio risk. They argue that this is due to 
the nomination of younger executives who exhibit lower risk aversion levels thus affecting 
firms’ overall risk. 
Finally, amongst Nordic and Swedish firms, Randøy, Oxelheim and Thomsen (2006) and 
Eklund, Palmberg and Wiberg (2009) fail to find a significant relationship between average 
director age and firm performance. 
This research believes that as age heterogeneity increases amongst directors, conflicts 
between board members belonging to different age cohorts would increase as a result of 
diverging opinions and risk tolerance levels. Executives belonging to older age cohorts tend to be 
more risk averse, while those belonging to the younger age categories are less risk averse. 
However, since a higher proportion of executives on US corporate boards belong to older age 
groups, with recent trends pointing to an increase in average director age, it could be argued that 
older directors would be less acceptable of younger directors’ opinions and unwilling to alter 
their beliefs and risk preferences. As such, the firm’s risk level is affected by older director’s 
behaviours, and would reflect their risk preferences. Therefore, it is expected that an increase in 
board age diversity would reduce firm risk.  
 
2.5.3 Educational Diversity 
The effect of the educational diversity of the board of directors on firms has been under 
researched in finance since the majority of researchers study the effects of demographic diversity 
factors.  
Kesner (1988) believes that excluding educational background from diversity studies is 
highly problematic as the experiences and skills that executives developed through their 
education provide them with a better understanding of complex business transactions and biases 
their business decisions.   
The resource dependence and human capital theories assume that education enhances 
executives’ skills, knowledge and value leading to superior organizational performance. Thus, 
educational diversity amongst board members is expected to lead to wider board perspectives 
and improved decision making (Setiyono & Tarazi, 2014). Additionally, Milliken and Martins 
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(1996) argue that educational diversity enhances problem-solving skills thus increasing firm 
financial performance. 
Grable (2000), Cardduci and Wong (2008) and Christiansen, Joensen and Rangvid (2008) 
argue that individuals with higher educational qualifications tend to make riskier household 
financial decisions and invest more heavily in stock markets, while Buccoil and Miniaci (2011) 
fail to find a significant relationship between average household educational level and their risk 
attitudes. However, these results cannot be directly applied to boards of directors given the 
differences and importance of the roles and responsibilities of board members. 
Bathula (2008), Pohjanen and Bengtsson (2010), Mahadeo et al. (2012) and Wellalage and 
Locke (2013) document negative effects of educationally heterogeneous board members on firm 
performance. They base their findings on the social integration theory and argue that the negative 
relationship is a result of conflicts and communication problems amongst board members with 
differing thoughts, perspectives and skills due to their educational discrepancies.   
Adnan, Sabli, Abd Rashid, Bin Hashim, Paino and Abdullah (2016) fail to find a 
significant relationship between board educational diversity and firm return on assets and return 
on equity. As such, they conclude that educational homogeneity amongst board members is 
better for enhancing firm performance.  
Kaplan, Klebanov and Sorensen (2008) also found no significant relationship between firm 
performance and average executive’s SAT and college selective scores, used as a proxy for 
education level.  
Graham and Harvey (2001) conclude that executives with higher educational qualifications 
such as MBAs and PhDs rely on more advanced valuation techniques such as the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model. As such, the implementation of these techniques is expected to reduce firm risk 
(Berger et al., 2014). Conversely, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) document higher aggressiveness 
levels and a tendency to run more levered firms amongst executives with MBAs suggesting that 
they employ policies that increase firm risk.  
Berger et al. (2014) conclude that bank portfolio risk decreases as the representation of 
executives with PhD degrees on boards of directors increases suggesting that they dedicate more 
time and effort for risk management activities.  
  16 
 
However, Setiyono and Tarazi (2014) find that, amongst Indonesian banks, educational 
diversity on boards of directors’ leads to better bank performance and higher income volatility 
and leverage risk.  
This paper argues that directors tend to display greater risk aversion levels as their 
educational attainments increase. This is expected to be motivated by their willingness to 
ascertain higher levels of job and income security, and the reputational factors associated with 
their professional career lives. On the other hand, directors with lower education levels are 
known to be more risk averse as they place higher emphasis on job security and their current 
career attainments. Hence boards with varying educational attainments are believed to have 
convergent risk preferences, and as such, educational diversity is expected to reduce firm risk. 
 
2.5.4 The Combined Effects of Diversity on Firms 
There is a lack of evidence on the overall effects of board diversity on firms since a limited 
number of papers in Finance study the overall effects of board of directors’ diversity on firm 
performance and risk using composite diversity measures. 
Randøy et al. (2006) study the effects of board diversity in Nordic firms encompassing 
gender, nationality and age attributes, on firm performance and stock market value. They 
construct an overall board diversity index as the sum of the percentages of females on the board, 
board mean age and foreign executives, and their results reveal that board diversity does not 
significantly affect firm performance and stock market valuation.  
Hafsi and Turgut (2013) focus on the relationship between board heterogeneity and US 
firm social corporate performance using a composite diversity index consisting of gender, age, 
ethnicity, experience and tenure characteristics. Gender and ethnic diversity were estimated as 
the percentage of female and non-Caucasian directors respectively, while a coefficient of 
variation was used to estimate each of age and tenure diversity. Finally, the average of board 
director committee experience amongst members was used as a proxy for experience diversity.  
In order to create their diversity index, the sample was divided into three terciles 
representing below average, average and above average levels of diversity. The three terciles 
were then given scores of zero, one and two respectively and the sum of the scores across all of 
the five diversity components was used as a diversity index. Their findings reveal a positive 
relationship between board diversity and firm performance.  
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Giannetti and Zhao (2016) provide compelling evidence on the affiliation between board 
diversity and US firm performance volatility as a measure of firm risk. The aspects incorporated 
in their board diversity measure are member ethnicity, age, education and experience, and they 
rely on the first principal component of the age coefficient of variation and Herfindahl-based 
indices of ethnicity, education and experience to construct their board diversity index. They 
concluded that firms exhibit higher volatility levels as board diversity increases, thus making 
them riskier. 
Conversely, Bernile, Bhagwat and Yonker (2018) document a negative relationship 
between board diversity and firm risk, measured as the annualized volatility of daily stock 
returns. Their diversity index, taking into account member gender, age, board experiences, 
ethnicity, education, and financial experiences, was estimated as the standardized sum of the 
percentage of female members on the board, standard deviation of member age and Herfindal-
based indices for ethnicity, number of directors that achieved their Bachelor’s degrees and 
financial experiences.  
As such, Bernile et al. (2018) argue that board diversity is used as a governance 
mechanism which moderates decisions and reduces the magnitude of groupthink problems thus 
reducing firm risk.  
 
2.6 Hypotheses 
In light of the arguments presented in the aforementioned theories and literature, this study 
argues that under normal market conditions, as boards of directors become more diverse, as a 
result of compositional fluctuations caused by changes in the representation of female 
executives, the generational distribution and the educational attainments of different members on 
the board, there is an increase in the probability of having more conflicts and communication 
problems between board members. This diminishes the cohesiveness of business decisions and 
prolongs decision making processes, making it harder for board members to agree on risk 
decisions thus emphasizing the need for compromises. This decreases the level of risk taken on 
by firms and reduces their overall volatility.  
However, under highly volatile market conditions, such as those observed during financial 
crises, increased conflicts and communication problems amongst diverse board members prolong 
their decision making processes thus serving as obstacles for effective business processes during 
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periods which require faster reaction times and more purposeful decision making. As such, an 
increase in board diversity under these circumstances is expected to reduce firm risk at a lower 
rate than that observed under normal market conditions as they fail to accommodate to 
fluctuating market conditions.  
Therefore, this paper investigates the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis (1): An increase in board of directors’ diversity reduces firm risk. 
 
Hypothesis (2):  During financial crises, an increase in board of directors’ diversity 
reduces firm risk at a lower rate than under normal market conditions.  
 
Figure 1 summarizes the expected directions of the effects of the various diversity 
measures on firm risk.     
 
3. Data  
3.1 Data Sources 
Data on the board composition and individual directors’ profiles are required in order to 
estimate the overall board diversity in terms of gender, age and education. 
The BoardEx database is used to retrieve the analytical organizational summary and 
director profile data including firm name, country, ticker, CIK code, the number of directors and 
percentage of males on each board and each director’s name, year of birth, educational 
achievements and tenure with the firm. Any missing data on the directors’ years of birth and 
highest educational achievements are hand collected from a combination of firm annual reports 
as well as proxy statements provided on the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 
EDGAR, Bloomberg and directors’ personal LinkedIn profiles where available. 
The retrieved tickers, CIK codes and firm names are used to collect and match each firm 
with its industry four-digit SIC code, CUSIP, financial data and daily stock price data obtained 
from Standard and Poor’s Compusat and The University of Chicago’s Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) respectively in order to estimate the control and dependent variables 
discussed in the following sections. 
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Firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999, and 4900 and 4999, representing financial 
and utility firms respectively, are excluded as they are highly regulated industries, and following 
the SEC’s definition of penny stocks, stocks with prices below $5 are eliminated from the sample 
as they exhibit high price fluctuations thus inflating the dependent variable. Firms with less than 
90 daily stock returns per year and inadequate financial data to estimate the dependent and 
control variables are also dropped. Finally, corporations with less than three years of data are 
removed as they do not contribute significantly to the data generating process, as well as those 
that end up in insolvency since they would bias the firm risk measures.  
This procedure produced a final sample consisting of 33,536 firm-year observations 
originating from 3,513 different US firms for the years between 2000 and 2017.  
 
3.2 Dependent Variable – Firm Risk 
This study is concerned with the effects that diversity amongst board members has on firm 
risk. As such, the dependent variable is a measure that accurately reflects the level of firm risk. 
In the literature, scholars employ various financial and performance measures which are argued 
to adequately proxy for firm risk.  
Chen et al. (2017) rely on modified firm financial distress scores by reducing the weight 
assigned to profitability measures thus creating risk measures which encompass both corporation 
long-term and short-term liquidity risk and insolvency risk. Giannetti and Zhao (2016), Sila et al. 
(2016) and Bernile et al. (2018) incorporate idiosyncratic risk estimates as measures of firm risk, 
calculated as the annualized standard deviation of the return residuals obtained using the market 
model.  
Other researchers proxy for total firm financial risk with the annualized volatility of daily 
firm stock returns (Lenard et al., 2014; Sila et al., 2016; Jizi & Nehme, 2017; Bernile et al., 
2018), or monthly firm stock returns (Lenard et al., 2014; Giannetti & Zhao, 2016; Bernile et al., 
2018) over the business year preceding the end of their fiscal year. 
On the other hand, Giannetti and Zhao (2016) verify the validity of their findings by 
adopting the volatility of firm earnings per share over the eight quarters preceding the end of 
their fiscal year as a measure of firm performance risk. However, such measure is subject to bias 
due to the lack of an adequate reporting frequency to estimate volatility. Alternatively, Sila et al. 
(2016) focus on estimates of firm systematic risk (beta), defined as the coefficients obtained by 
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regressing firm monthly stock returns on the returns of the CRSP Equally Weighted Index in a 
market model based methodology 
Following Sila et al.’s (2016) methodology, the results of this study depend on firm 
systematic risk (beta) as a quantification of firm risk. This is estimated by the coefficient 
produced from regressing firm daily stock returns in the year prior to their fiscal year end on the 
daily returns of the CRSP Value Weighted Index on matching dates in a market model 
regression. Beta values greater than, equal to or less than one indicate that the firm’s stock 
exhibits higher, equal or lower volatility levels than the market index respectively thus in turn 
signalling higher, equal and lower risk levels, while negative values indicate that a firm’s stock is 
inversely correlated to the market.  
In an attempt to ascertain the validity of this study findings, additional analysis is 
performed on the approximations of total firm financial risk, calculated as the square root of 252 
multiplied by the standard deviation of a minimum of 90 daily stock returns realized by the firm 
in the year prior to its fiscal year end in accordance with Lenard et al. (2014), Sila et al. (2016), 
Jizi & Nehme (2017), and Bernile et al. (2018).     
 
3.3 Independent Variable – Board Diversity 
This research is interested in the overall consequences of board diversity in terms of board 
member gender, age and education. As such, a composite diversity index which encompasses all 
three factors is developed, which serves as the independent variable of interest.   
The majority of the existing empirical papers on the effects of gender diversity mentioned 
in the literature review (e.g. Lenard et al., 2014; Setityono & Tarazi, 2014; Sila et al., 2016; Chen 
et al., 2017; Jizi & Nehme, 2017) base their gender diversity approximations on the ratio of the 
total number of female directors elected to the board to the total number of board members, or 
categorical variables that indicate the presence of female executives (e.g. Lenard et al., 2014; 
Jizi&Nehme, 2017; Chen et al., 2017).   
Interestingly, Wellalage and Locke (2013) adapt Blau’s (1977) and Shannon’s (1948) 
heterogeneity indices to reflect levels of board gender heterogeneity. These measures are widely 
implemented in economics and finance diversity studies as they are argued to provide better 
reflections of a firm’s relative heterogeneity (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008).  
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Equation (1) outlines the calculation of Blau’s (1977) diversity index where Pi measures 
the proportion of individuals that belong to category 𝑖. 




                                                                                                   (1) 
Similarly, equation (2) outlines the calculation of Shannon’s (1948) diversity index where 
Pi has the same definition as that in the Blau index.  
Higher values of both diversity indices indicate higher heterogeneity levels amongst the sample. 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 = − ∑ 𝑃𝑖 ln(𝑃𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                                                     (2) 
The literature on the effects of age diversity also follows various ways to estimate the 
level of age heterogeneity amongst board members. Kim and Lim (2010) allocate scores to the 
directors in their sample based on the age category they belong to, and estimate the average firm 
age score as a measure of diversity. However, Darmadi (2011), Wellalage and Locke (2013) and 
Ferrero-Ferrero, Fernández-Izquierdo and Muñoz-Torres (2015) distribute board members into 
different generational cohorts and calculate Blau indices on the basis of the proportion of 
directors that are a part of each cohort. Conversely, Talavera et al. (2018) rely on the age 
coefficient of variation amongst board members to proxy for board age diversity. 
Additionally, scholars adopt varying methods to measure the level of educational 
heterogeneity amongst board members. While Bathula (2008) and Adnan et al. (2016) employ 
the percentage of members holding PhD and master degrees or beyond respectively as 
educational diversity measures, Wellalage and Locke (2013) and Setiyono and Tarazi (2014) 
compute Blau indices focusing on executives’ highest educational achievements.  
This study computes both Blau and Shannon diversity indices to estimate the degree of 
firm level board heterogeneity with respect to each of the three aspects: gender, age and 
education.  
Similar to Wellalage and Locke (2013), this study employs the percentages of male and 
female directors to calculate the gender indices. Additionally, following Ferrero-Ferro et al.’s 
(2015) methodology, this research estimates the proportions of board members belonging to one 
of five generational cohorts based on their year of birth outlined in Table 1 in order to generate 
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the age diversity indices. Finally, consistent with Wellalage and Locke (2013), the percentage of 
executives with maximum educational achievements classified into one of the five categories 
listed in Table 2, are computed to quantify board educational heterogeneity.  
In the interest of creating a relative composite diversity measure, the individual gender, 
age and education indices are distributed into quantiles and allocated scores which reflect their 
fractional quantile positions. The gender measures are divided on the basis of the median and 
given scores of one-half and one respectively, while each of the age and education measures are 
split into terciles and assigned scores of one-third, two-third and one respectively. The firm’s 
overall diversity index is then computed as six times the sum of its gender, age and education 
scores thus giving equal weights to the individual aspects and creating a relative composite 
diversity index with values that range between seven and 18. Appendix B outlines the number of 
quantiles per diversity aspect, the scores assigned to each quantile and five hypothetical 
examples of estimating the composite firm diversity index.  
The analysis and conclusions of this study rely on the Blau based composite diversity 
index. However, a Shannon based composite diversity measure is implemented to test the 
robustness of the results to different diversity measures. Moreover, additional robustness tests are 
performed using two other composite diversity indices computed as the simple sum of each 
firm’s gender, age and education Blau and Shannon indices respectively.   
 
3.4 Control Variables  
Several researchers argue that various firm and board specific factors influence firm 
performance and risk. As such, a set of firm and board specific factors, including firm size, 
leverage, market-to-book ratio, return on assets, board size and average board member tenure, 
are added to the regression analysis to control for their effects. 
Richard (2000), Smith, Smith and Verner (2006) and Labelle, Francoeur and Lakhal (2015) 
assume that size increases the probability that a firm would achieve economies of scale and 
market power. Also, larger firms are known to have better access to external financial resources 
which could enhance their profits and market returns (Carter et al., 2010; Labelle et al., 2015). 
On the other hand, Baek, Kang and Suh (2004) believe that large firms benefit from the luxury of 
their ability to diversify their investments which leads to less volatile stock prices as confirmed 
by Giannetti and Zhao’s (2015) and Jizi and Nehme’s (2017) results. 
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However, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) document a negative relationship between 
firm size and performance which they attribute to increased agency problems and divergence of 
interests in large firms, while Sila et al. (2016) find a positive relationship between firm size and 
systematic risk.  
These arguments, in turn, suggest the existence of variation amongst the market returns of 
large and small firms which affects their risk. Thus, this study uses the natural logarithm of a 
firm’s total book value of assets as obtained from Compustat to control for the effects of firm 
size and expects that large firms have the resources and abilities to tolerate higher levels of risk 
thus indicating a positive relationship between firm size and risk. 
On the other hand, compared to unlevered firms, highly levered firms are commonly 
known to have higher operations risk due to their tendency to encounter significantly larger costs 
in bankruptcy cases (Campbell &Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Labelle et al., 2015).  
Researchers also believe that leverage could also be used as a method to reduce the 
magnitude of the agency problem and improve stock performance as directors of levered firms 
are motivated to collaborate and work harder in order to reduce firm debt and avoid bankruptcy 
(Jizi & Nehme, 2017). As such, this suggests that highly levered firms tend to take riskier 
business decisions with higher payoff rates which is consistent with Lenard et al.’s (2014), 
Giannetti and Zhao’s (2015) and Bernile et al.’s (2018) findings. Conversely, the fact that highly 
levered firms face higher chances of financial distress may reduce the extent to which directors 
make risky decisions which is evidenced in Sila et al.’s (2016) results.  Therefore, the ratio of a 
firm’s total book value of debt to its total book value of assets obtained from Compustat is 
incorporated in the analysis of this study in order to control for firm leverage, and a positive 
relationship between a firm’s leverage level and its risk is anticipated.  
The level of growth opportunities available to firms is also expected to alter the variability 
of their prospective financial performance which ultimately affects their riskiness (Jizi & Dixon, 
2017). Chen et al. (2017) use firm market-to-book ratios to proxy for firm growth expectations. 
Jizi and Nehme (2017) explain that high market-to-book ratios signal a firm’s ability to 
adequately put its cash flows to use by investing in new business opportunities which could 
increase future returns thus increasing firm risk (Guay, 1999). Furthermore, Sila et al. (2016), 
Jizi and Nehme (2017) and Bernile et al. (2018) confirm the existence of a positive relationship 
between market-to-book ratios and return volatility. Accordingly, firm market-to-book ratio, 
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measured as the ratio of a firm’s market value of equity to its book value of equity obtained from 
a combination of Compustat and CRSP sources is incorporated in this study to proxy for the 
effects of firm growth, and is expected to be positively associated with firm risk. 
Various scholars point to the existence of a relationship between firm profitability and risk, 
especially amongst diverse boards. Hutchinson, Mack, Plastow and Montroe (2015) provide 
compelling evidence on an increased correlation between firm risk and return on assets, as a 
proxy for profitability, amongst Australian gender diverse boards. Baek et al. (2004) posit that 
profitable firms have a higher resistance to economic downturns and financial situations as 
profitability acts as a reward for the higher risks investors bear. In the literature, Lenard et al. 
(2014), Sila et al. (2016), Jizi and Nehme (2017) and Bernile et al. (2018) document negative 
relationships between return on assets and different measures of firm risk in diverse boards. 
Therefore, firm return on asset, estimated as the ratio of net income to total book value of assets 
obtained from Compustat is included in this study to accommodate for the effects of profitability 
on firm risk.  
Moreover, academicians argue that the number of directors on boards, as a measure of 
board size, affects firm performance and risk. Carter et al. (2003) and Labelle et al. (2015) expect 
that larger boards possess better information processing skills and decision making processes 
which enhance firm performance due to an increase in the amount of member external relations. 
However, their results demonstrate the existence of a negative relationship between board size 
and firm performance due to an increase in agency problems and inter-director conflicts in larger 
boards. 
Cheng (2008) documents a reduction in stock return variability as board size increases, 
which he associates with less extreme decisions and longer discussions amongst members (Sah 
and Stiglitz, 1991). This was further confirmed by Lenard et al.’s (2014) and Sila et al.’s (2016) 
findings while focusing exclusively on gender diverse boards. Conversely, Wang (2012) 
concludes that smaller boards force CEOs to take on riskier business decisions. Interestingly, 
Giannetti and Zhao (2015) and Jizi and Nehme (2017) fail to find a significant relationship 
between board size and firm risk amongst US and UK firms respectively. As such, this study 
controls for the effects of board size using the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the 
board in a given year obtained from BoardEx, and predicts a negative relationship to firm risk 
due to increased director conflicts amongst large boards.   
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Director tenure is a measure of the amount of time that the director has been as part of the 
organization or its board of directors. Setiyono and Tarazi (2014) explain that a director that has 
been with a firm for a longer period of time is expected to have a better understanding of the 
nature of the firm’s business and policies and would therefore lead to better performance. In fact, 
Hambrick, Cho and Chen (1996) show that tenure heterogeneous top management teams make 
more business decisions which have positive effects on firm market share and profitability. 
Similarly, Tihayni, Ellstrand, Daily and Dalton (2000) conclude that firms with higher tenured 
boards engage in higher international diversification levels which could enhance their risk 
exposure.  
Contrarily, Carson et al. (2015) point out that employees that have been as part of an 
organization for longer periods tend to be highly committed to the status quo, and as such, they 
would take fewer business possibilities into account, resulting in less risky business outcomes 
(Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Michel & Hambrick, 1992; Hambrick, Geletkanycz & Fredrickson, 
1993). Consequently, in this study, the average time in the company in years amongst all 
directors is used to account for the effects of tenure variation and is expected to be negatively 
related to firm risk. 
The correlation between board diversity and firm risk is expected to vary across different 
industries. Carter et al. (2003) claim that financial firms elect the highest number of female 
directors. Similarly, Kang et al. (2007) find that the age diversity amongst Australian board 
members differs depending on the industry that the firm belongs to. As a result, this study relies 
on firm two digits SIC codes to control for industry effects.    
Finally, this research includes year fixed effects to account for differences in economic 
situations and business cycles and time variation not attributable to other explanatory variables 




Panel fixed effect regression analysis is applied on the sample to determine the impact of 
board diversity on firm risk. Equation (3) outlines the model used to test hypothesis (1) where 
riski,t is a measure of firm systematic risk (firm beta) and total risk (firm annualized volatility) in 
turn. Diversity_Indexi,t takes on the values of the composite Blau and Shannon  diversity indices 
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explained in the previous sections. φk and πt represent industry and year fixed effects 
respectively, while the remaining variables are as explained above. Appendix A contains the 
definitions of the full variable set used in the study. All variables are winsorized at the fifth and 
95
th
 percentiles of their cross-sectional distributions for the purpose of the analysis, and standard 
errors are clustered at the firm-level to correct for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
   
𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜑𝑘
+ 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                 (3) 
 
Equation (4) outlines the model used to test Hypothesis (2) where the variables have the 
same definitions as those in Equation (3). However, to capture the effects of periods of high 
financial volatility, a financial crisis dummy variable is introduced to the model which take on 
the value of 1 for the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, and 0 otherwise. Due to the nature of this 
analysis, year fixed effects are eliminated from the model. Additionally, an interaction of the 
dummy and the diversity index is introduced to determine the relationship between board 
diversity and firm risk during financial crises. As such, β3 is the coefficient of interest for 
Hypothesis (2) and a significantly positive value would support the argumentation.  
 
𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌        
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 × 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥+𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜑𝑘 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                               (4) 
 
4.2 Endogeneity Concerns 
Establishing a causal relationship between board diversity and firm risk is inhibited by the 
endogeneity of the board’s diversity. As such, following Schweizer, Walker and Zhang’s (2017) 
methodology, this study incorporates two additional tests in order to accommodate for this 
problem by determining whether changes in board diversity are affecting firm risk.   
For the purpose of the first test, two sets of dummy variables are created to account for 
large positive and negative changes in the firm’s diversity index over a one year period thus 
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reflecting unexpected shocks, captured by the index jump and the index drop dummy variables 
respectively. As such, the dummy variables are equal to 1 if the change in the firm’s diversity 
index lies in the highest or lowest fifth percentile of the cross-sectional change distributions 
respectively and 0 otherwise. Equation (5) outlines the model used for this purpose where β2 is 
the coefficient of interest. A significantly negative (positive) coefficient following an increase 
(decrease) in the diversity index would provide further support for Hypothesis (1) by indicating 
an instantaneous decline (increase) in firm risk. 
 
𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋_𝐽𝑈𝑀𝑃(𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑃)_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌
+ 𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜑𝑘 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (5) 
 
 As for the second test, a super index dummy variable is created which takes on the value 1 
when the composite diversity index is in the upper 20
th
 percentile of its cross-sectional 
distribution and 0 otherwise. This is used to test whether firms with higher board diversity levels 
indeed exhibit lower risk as argued in Hypothesis (1). Equation (6) outlines the model used for 
this purpose where β2 is the coefficient of interest, and a significantly negative coefficient is 
expected.  
 
𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑈𝑃𝐸𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌
+ 𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜑𝑘 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (6) 
     
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the differing firm risk measures, diversity estimates, 
composite diversity indices and firm specific characteristics used throughout this study’s 
empirical analysis processes are provided in Table 3. 
Low risk levels are demonstrated, on average, for the sampled firms with a mean firm 
systematic risk (beta) of 1.18 and an average annualized volatility of 0.486. However, large 
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ranges and standard deviations for both measures are noticeable due to the use of a multi-year 
sample including periods classified by high financial volatility levels, justifying the need to 
control for year effects.  
The Blau board gender diversity measures range between 0 and 0.444, indicating the 
presence of gender homogeneous boards within the sample. However, a low median (0.180) 
supports the notion that US boards are lagging in terms of their gender compositions caused by 
the low representation of female directors. On the other hand, boards exhibit high levels of age 
and educational diversity. Interestingly, the minimum educational heterogeneity measure (0.320) 
indicates that all firms contain directors with differing educational accomplishments. 
Additionally, the composite diversity indices demonstrate that boards are compositionally 
heterogeneous due to varying combinations of the incorporated diversity aspects, shown by high 
means and standard deviations respectively.  
The number of directors on firm boards range between 5 and 14, with a mean and median 
of 8 members. They also possess high levels of variation in their tenure levels reflected in the 
variable’s high mean (9.02 years) and standard deviation (4.64) emphasizing the necessity to 
account for tenure variations.  
Finally, large variations in firm size and market-to-book ratios, associated with the use of a 
multi-industry sample, demonstrated by the variables’ large ranges and standard deviations 
respectively, justify the need to control for industry effects. 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the pairwise correlation between the various Blau based 
heterogeneity measures of the components of board diversity and the composite diversity index. 
The high correlation values between the individual components and the composite index 
emphasize the fact that the index accurately incorporates the effects of all aspects. On the other 
hand, the weak correlations between the differing individual components demonstrate that each 
measure captures a distinct heterogeneity dimension. 
Panel B displays the pairwise correlation between the independent, dependent and control 
variables. All values are less than 0.5 with the exception of the correlation between firm size and 
board size (0.587) suggesting that multicollinearity does not affect the analysis’s validity. 
However, variance inflation factors are also calculated as supplementary tests for 
multicollinearity issues in the multivariate regressions. As such, this study ensures that it does 
not appear to cause any problems in a multivariate context. 
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− Please insert Tables 3 and 4 about here – 
 
5.2 Board Diversity and Firm Risk 
Tables 5 and 6 report the results pertaining to the effects of board diversity on firm beta 
and annualized volatility respectively. Panels A and B of each table rely on Blau and Shannon 
measures in turn. Column (1) estimates the overall effects of board diversity on firm risk. The 
results demonstrate that higher board diversity is associated with lower firm risk, with 5% and 
10% significance levels for firm beta and annualized volatility respectively. These findings are 
consistent for both Blau and Shannon diversity measures. Specifically, a 1% increase in a firm’s 
Blau board diversity index is associated with a 4.3% and 6.0% decrease in firm beta and 
annualized volatility respectively. This is in line with Bernile et al.’s (2018) findings and 
provides evidence to support this study’s first hypothesis that more diverse boards would face 
higher conflicts and disagreement, making it harder on them to agree on risk decisions thus 
reducing the level of risk taken on by firms. 
On the other hand, consistent with Carter et al. (2010), Labelle et al. (2015) and Sila et al.’s 
(2016) findings, large firms have significantly higher risk levels due to increased economies of 
scale, market power and better access to financial resources which would enable them to tolerate 
higher risk levels. 
In agreement with Cheng (2008), Lenard et al.’s (2014) and Sila et al.’s (2016) larger 
boards contribute to reducing firm risk. This could be interpreted as an indication of the directors 
of larger boards being unable to voice their opinions due to increased disagreements and 
communication problems thus prolonging decision making processes. Moreover, contrary to this 
study’s expectations, an increase in firm leverage decreases firm risk. This indicates that levered 
firms reduce the extent to which they engage in risky decisions, as argued by Sila et al. (2016), 
due to increased chances of facing financial distress. It also suggests that directors’ actions 
appear to be driven by job security motives thus taking actions that are perceived to be better for 
their own self-interests.  
Market-to-book ratio, as a proxy for firm growth, is positively associated with firm risk. 
This suggests that firms are investing in new business opportunities, increasing the variability of 
their future returns and altering firm risk which is in accordance with the arguments and findings 
of prior researchers. Furthermore, as firms become more profitable, estimated by their return on 
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assets, they tend to engage in less risky decisions. This is an indication that firms focus on 
maintaining their profitability levels by taking on less risk which is in line with Lenard et al. 
(2014), Sila et al. (2016), Jizi and Nehme (2017) and Bernile et al. (2018).  
Additionally, the longer directors that have been part of a business, the more comfortable 
they get with the status quo and the less resistant they become to change. The findings confirm 
this notion by showing that an increase in the average time that directors have been part of an 
organization significantly decreases firm risk.  
Columns (2), (3) and (4) of Tables 5 and 6 break down the combined diversity effect into 
its individual gender, age and education components in turn. In line with this research 
expectations, and Lenard et al. (2014), Loukil and Yousfi (2016) and Jizi and Nehme’s (2017) 
findings, the analysis in column (2) reveals that gender diversity reduces firm risk with the effect 
being statistically significant at the 5% level. However, the effect is marginally small in 
magnitude as a 1% increase in board gender diversity leads to a 0.9% and 1.3% decrease in firm 
beta and annualized volatility respectively. This is an indication that gender diverse boards are 
better at governing firms and monitoring management’s actions. Additionally, it shows that 
female directors are not marginalized, but rather they tend to voice out their concerns in an 
attempt to modify firm risk decisions. Therefore, this proves that it is beneficial for firms to 
increase the representation of females on boards for reasons other than reducing discrimination 
and improving the firm’s image.  
On the other hand, Column (3), in line with Randøy (2006) and Darmadi (2011), provides 
compelling evidence that board age diversity does not significantly influence firm risk. This 
finding could be driven by a lack of an adequate variation in the age cohorts represented on US 
boards. In spite of these conclusions, however, firms should still engage in increasing board age 
diversity in an attempt to promote equality and fairness in workplaces.  
Finally, consistent with this research’s argumentation, column (4) reveals that director 
educational diversity has a significant risk reducing effect on firms. Specifically, a 1% increase 
in director educational diversity reduces firm beta and annualized volatility by 4.8% and 5.0% 
respectively. This indicates that board educational composition has the strongest effect on firm 
risk. Additionally, from a social identity theory standpoint, the result suggests that educationally 
diverse directors ignore their differences and are motivated by job security reasons to act 
together in a risk averse manner reducing firm risk. 
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− Please insert Tables 5 and 6 about here – 
To address the potential endogeneity issue associated with the board’s diversity affecting 
firm risk, inspired by the work of Schweizer et al. (2017), this study tests for the consequences of 
large unexpected increases and decreases in board diversity over a one year period. It is expected 
that large spontaneous increases in a firm’s diversity score be accompanied by greater reductions 
in firm risk, while large unprompted decreases in director heterogeneity be followed by increases 
in firm risk.  
Panels A and B of Table 7 provide the coefficients of the effects of increases in director 
diversity that are within the upper fifth percentile of their cross sectional distributions on firm 
beta and annualized volatility respectively using an index jump categorical variable. The 
negative and statistically significant coefficient associated with this variable confirms that boards 
demonstrating a spontaneous increase in their board member diversity indeed observe decreases 
in their risk levels.
1
 
Panels A and B of Table 8 report the estimates pertaining to the reactions of firm beta and 
annualized volatility, in turn, to decreases in director heterogeneity that are within the lowest 
fifth percentile of their cross sectional distributions by relying on an index drop categorical 
variable. The positive and statistically significant coefficient indicates that firm risk significantly 
increases following an instantaneous decline in director diversity.
1
  
− Please insert Tables 7 and 8 about here – 
To confirm whether firms with high diversity levels observe significantly larger reductions 
in their risk levels, as expected under Hypothesis (1), an additional test is performed. Panels A 
and B of Table 9 display the estimates of the effects of firms with board diversity levels 
belonging to the upper 20
th
 percentile of the annual diversity indices distribution on firm beta and 
annualized volatility respectively by employing a super index categorical variable. The negative 
and statistically significant coefficient affirms that firms with higher heterogeneity levels notice 
significantly larger declines in their risk levels. As such, these tests provide strong evidence 
supporting this study’s first hypothesis, and succeed at establishing a causal relationship between 
board diversity and firm risk.
1 
                                                             
1
 These findings could also be affected by prior changes in firm risk which are not accounted for in the tests.  
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− Please insert Table 9 about here – 
To summarize, the conclusions presented in this section reveal that even though board age 
diversity does not affect firm risk, the combined effect of the various diversity aspects negatively 
affects decision making processes, and as such, reduces the volatility of firm outcomes as 
expected under Hypothesis (1).  
 
5.3 Board Diversity and Firm Risk During Financial Crises 
The estimates of the effects of board member heterogeneity on firm beta and annualized 
volatility during periods characterized as having high levels of market volatility, as a proxy for 
large business environment changes, are displayed in Table 10 Panels A and B respectively. 
The positive and significant coefficient on the financial crisis indicator variable indicates 
the existence of a change in firm risk in the sample during these periods. Additionally, 
confirming Hypothesis (2), the positive coefficient on the crisis dummy interaction term 
indicates that an increase in board diversity during periods of high financial uncertainty lowers 
the rate at which firm risk is reduced, suggesting that board diversity has a significantly lower 
net effect on firm risk during more volatile market conditions. This evidence suggests that 
increased conflicts and communication problems between directors prolong their decision 
making processes, and thus serve as obstacles for effective business processes especially during 
periods which require faster reaction times and more purposeful decision making. This finding 
also confirms that director heterogeneity s is not equally effective at reducing risk under varying 
market circumstances. 
− Please insert Table 10 about here – 
 
5.4 Robustness Checks 
 To ascertain the validity of the effects of board diversity on firm risk, this study 
incorporates both Blau and Shannon diversity measures in its tables, and analyzes their effects on 
two firm risk measures as dependent variables: beta and annualized volatility. The results 
reported in the previous sections remain unchanged independent of the diversity and risk 
measure employed. 
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As a second robustness check, this study repeats the analysis performed in section 5.2 
using two alternative composite board diversity measures constructed as the simple sum of each 
firm’s Blau and Shannon diversity measures. The estimated coefficients are reported in columns 
(1) and (2) of Table 11 respectively. 
Panel A of Table 11 reports the coefficients where firm beta is the dependent variable 
while Panel B relies on annualized volatility as the dependent variable. The results further 
support Hypothesis (1) by demonstrating that an increase in board member heterogeneity reduces 
both measures of firm risk, while the signs and significance of all variables remain unchanged. 
This confirms that the findings are robust to various index formulations and are not as a result of 
spurious correlation with the composite index. 
− Please insert Table 11 about here – 
 
6. Conclusion 
The effects of the diversity of a firm’s board of directors on its performance, value and risk 
is a highly controversial topic in Finance. In fact, recent trends in corporate governance research 
reflect an increase in the amount of studies investigating the role and composition of boards of 
directors. However, a lack of evidence on the outcomes of the demographic composition of 
boards still exists.  
The widening of the candidate pool available to businesses caused by the world’s varying 
demographic composition, legislative changes and cultural developments, ultimately leading to 
an increase in workplace diversity, justifies the need for a better understanding of this 
phenomenon from a business perspective. 
Theories point to the existence of a strong association between board diversity and firm 
performance and risk. On the one hand, Ross (1973) and Mitnick’s (1975) Agency Theory 
expects diverse boards of directors to be better monitors and regulators of management’s 
decisions. On the other hand, Barney’s (1991) Resource-Based Theory and Becker’s (1964) 
Human Capital Theory predict that heterogeneity amongst board members increases the 
resources at firms’ disposal and enhances their problem solving and leadership styles. This, in 
turn, is expected to result in higher firm innovation and creativity levels and improve the quality 
of their business decisions. Contrarily, social psychology’s Social Identity Theory explains that 
  34 
 
as boards become more diverse, there tends to be a higher probability of encountering a larger 
amount of conflicts and communication breakdowns between directors from differing 
backgrounds. This would hinder group dynamics and decision making processes and adversely 
affect firm corporate performance (Carter et al., 2003; Giannetti & Zhao, 2016). Theories 
therefore forecast inconsistencies in the nature and direction of the relationship between board 
diversity and firm risk. Consistently, the results of numerous empirical studies conclude positive 
effects while others document negative or insignificant consequences.   
This research aims to determine the overall effects of board diversity in terms of director 
gender, age and educational level on firm risk. Composite diversity indices, constructed from a 
combination of Blau (1977) and Shannon (1948) heterogeneity measures respectively, reflecting 
the board’s composition with respect to the three characteristics, are developed using a sample of 
3,513 US non-financial and non-utility firms for the period between 2000 and 2017. 
Relying on the Social Identity Theory, this study argues that higher board diversity levels 
would increase the chances of conflicts and communication problems between members. As 
such, this is expected to reduce the cohesiveness of business decisions and act as an obstacle for 
board members to agree on risk decisions thus decreasing the level of risk taken on by firms and 
their overall risk. 
The results reveal that while board member age diversity does not affect firm risk, gender 
and educational heterogeneity are negatively related to firm systematic and total risk, measured 
as a firm’s beta and annualized stock return volatility respectively. Moreover, an increase in 
boards’ overall diversity, as estimated by the composite diversity indices, is found to reduce firm 
risk. This is in line with the study’s first hypothesis and could be interpreted as an indication of 
an increase in inter-director conflicts and disagreements, making it more difficult for boards to 
decide on business decisions thus reducing the risk taken on by firms under normal market 
conditions. The findings are unaffected by different risk measures, diversity measures and index 
compositions. They are also robust to endogeneity concerns as firms that are characterized as 
having high diversity levels amongst their board members exhibit significantly lower risk levels, 
while those that demonstrate increases (decreases) in the board’s overall diversity levels observe 
significant decreases (increases) in their respective risk levels indicating that the risk alterations 
are as a result of the diversity variations. 
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On the other hand, during high market volatility periods, higher heterogeneity levels 
amongst directors lower the rate at which firm risk is reduced, suggesting that the net effect of 
diversity on firm risk is significantly lower during more volatile market conditions. As such, 
boards fail to accommodate their business decisions to fluctuating market conditions. This result 
is consistent with the second hypothesis and provides further evidence of an increase in board 
member conflicts and disagreements, increasing the consequences of financial crises. 
In general, the empirical analysis supports the notion that board diversity is beneficial to 
firms under normal market conditions. This conclusion is consistent with Bernile et al.’s (2018) 
findings. However, board diversity strengthens the effects of market wide volatility on firm risk 
during periods which require faster reaction times and clearer decision making, leading to an 
increase in firm risk. Therefore, this suggests that diversity is not equally effective under 
differing market circumstances.  
These conclusions have several implications for shareholders as the rates of return on their 
investments are highly dependent on management’s risky decisions under the premise of the 
risk-return relationship. Consequently, firms with higher levels of board heterogeneity have 
lower risk levels and thus provide shareholders with lower returns on their investments. 
Shareholders should therefore use their voting rights to elect board directors in a manner which 
reflects their risk tolerance levels. Additionally, financial investors would equally benefit from 
utilizing these results in order to make future investment decisions which are suitable for their 
risk preferences. Furthermore, current and future employees face several advantages from the 
interpretation of the study’s conclusions as their livelihood and future earnings are dependent on 
firm risk. On the other hand, policy makers could rely on the findings by implementing board 
diversity quotas as tools to control firm risk.  
While this analysis contributes to the diversity literature, it has some limitations that could 
be addressed by further researchers. The use of a sample consisting of only US firms limits the 
translatability of the results to other countries. Further research could benefit from the use of a 
multi-country sample thus facilitating a comparison of the differences between the effects of 
member heterogeneity in developed, developing and underdeveloped countries. On the other 
hand, the elimination of financial and utility firms confines the ability to investigate potential 
discrepancies in the effects within these industries. As such, additional research could focus on 
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the combined effects of diversity on financial firms thus enabling a better understanding of the 
relationship.  
Additionally, the lack of accessible data on additional board characteristics such as director 
nationality, the ratio of outside directors and director previous board experiences restricts the 
extent to which the study is able to incorporate other diversity aspects into the diversity indices 
and control for other variables known to affect firm performance and risk. Future researchers 
should thus consider incorporating such aspects where available from other sources. Finally, 
investigating the potential consequences of the implementation of the gender quota in California, 
compared to the effects of letting companies freely decide on the composition of their boards of 
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Figures and Tables 










Table 1: Age Index Groups 
This table provides the generational cohorts to which directors could belong based on their years of birth used to 
estimate firm-year age diversity measures. 
 
  Generation Years of Birth  
1. Lost Generation 1900 - 1921  
2. Greatest Generation 1922 - 1945  
3. Baby Boomers 1946 - 1964  
4. Generation X 1965 - 1983  
5. Generation Y 1984 - 2002  
     
 
Table 2: Education Index Groups 
This table provides the educational categories to which directors highest educational qualifications could belong 
used to estimate firm-year educational diversity measures. 
 
  Educational Qualification   
1. Less than a bachelor's degree 
 
2. Bachelor's degree or equivalent 
 
3. Vocational training programs and professional certifications 
 
4. Master's degree 
 
5. PhD and beyond   
   






Composite Board Diversity Under 
Normal Market Conditions 
H1 (−) 
Composite Board Diversity During 
Financial Crisis  
H2  
(Lower Effect) 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
The sample is composed of all public non-financial and non-utility firms with adequate data on the BoardEx 
database used to estimate the gender, age and nationality indices in order to develop the composite board diversity 
index for the years 2000 to 2017. The final sample consists of 33,536 firm-year observations. The table below 
reports the descriptive statistics for the various characteristics used throughout this study. The variables are defined 




 percentiles of their cross-sectional distributions. 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Firm Risk: 
Firm Beta 1.180 0.552 1.140 -0.405 2.827 
Firm Annualized Volatility 0.486 0.901 0.431 0.164 6.511 
 
Diversity: 
Blau Gender Diversity 0.155 0.145 0.180 0.000 0.444 
Blau Age Diversity 0.422 0.131 0.460 0.000 0.625 
Blau Education Diversity 0.597 0.102 0.615 0.320 0.738 
Shannon Gender Diversity 0.251 0.226 0.325 0.000 0.636 
Shannon Age Diversity 0.649 0.206 0.662 0.000 1.036 
Shannon Education Diversity 1.034 0.229 1.055 0.500 1.374 
Blau Board Diversity Index 12.274 2.747 12.000 7.000 18.000 
Shannon Board Diversity Index 12.274 2.806 12.000 7.000 18.000 
 
Firm Specific Characteristics: 
Size 6.767 1.622 6.676 3.586 10.332 
Board Size 2.099 0.246 2.079 1.609 2.639 
Leverage 0.482 0.220 0.481 0.111 0.989 
Market-to-Book 3.158 2.589 2.328 -0.513 14.509 
Return on Assets 0.025 0.107 0.046 -0.412 0.201 
Tenure 9.019 4.636 8.533 0.900 19.267 
 
 
  46 
 
Table 4: Correlation Matrices 
Panel A reports the Pairwise correlation between the Blau based indices of the components of board diversity and the composite board diversity index used in 
this study. Panel B reports the Pairwise correlation between all the variables implemented in this study. Values in bold indicate significance at the 5% level.  The 




 percentiles of their cross-sectional distributions. 
 
Panel A                   
  
1 2 3 4 
    
Blau Board Diversity Index 1 1.000 
       
Blau Gender Diversity 2 0.470 1.000 
      
Blau Age Diversity 3 0.464 -0.089 1.000 
     
Blau Education Diversity 4 0.562 0.042 0.054 1.000 
    
          
Panel B                   
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Firm Beta 1 1.000 
       
Blau Board Diversity Index 2 -0.067 1.000 
      
Size 3 0.005 0.193 1.000 
     
Board Size 4 -0.051 0.320 0.587 1.000 
    
Leverage 5 -0.040 0.110 0.437 0.301 1.000 
   
M/B 6 0.016 -0.010 -0.011 0.018 0.116 1.000 
  
ROA 7 -0.159 0.069 0.209 0.089 -0.058 0.047 1.000 
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Table 5: Board Diversity and Firm Beta 
Panel A columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) report the panel regression estimates where board diversity is measured as the 
composite Blau board diversity index, and the individual Blau gender, age and education indices respectively, while 
Panel B Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) report the panel regression estimates where board diversity is measured as the 
composite Shannon board diversity index, and the individual Shannon gender, age and education indices 
respectively. Firm beta is the dependent variable. All models include year and industry fixed effects. The definitions 




 percentiles of their 
cross-sectional distributions.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors that are 
clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Panel A: Blau Board Diversity and Firm Beta  
  Dependent Variable: Firm Risk (Beta)   
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Blau Board Diversity Index -0.00413** 
       
 
(-2.54) 
       
Blau Gender Diversity 
  
-0.0716** 
     
   
(-2.03) 
     
Blau Age Diversity 
    
0.00526 
   
     
(0.16) 
   
Blau Education Diversity 
      
-0.0943** 
 
       
(-2.09) 
 




































































































(-2.99)   
Year Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
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Table 5: Board Diversity and Firm Beta – Continued 
Panel B: Shannon Board Diversity and Firm Beta  
  Dependent Variable: Firm Risk (Beta)   
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Shannon Board Diversity Index -0.00444*** 
       
 
(-2.78) 
       
Shannon Gender Diversity 
  
-0.0382* 
     
   
(-1.66) 
     
Shannon Age Diversity 
    
0.00129 
   
     
(0.06) 
   
Shannon Education Diversity 
      
-0.0430** 
 
       
(-2.10) 
 




































































































(-3.00)   
Year Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
 
























Mean VIF 1.32   1.33   1.29   1.3   
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Table 6: Board Diversity and Firm Stock Return Volatility 
Panel A columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) report the panel regression estimates where board diversity is measured as the 
composite Blau board diversity index, and the individual Blau gender, age and education indices respectively, while 
Panel B Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) report the panel regression estimates where board diversity is measured as the 
composite Shannon board diversity index, and the individual Shannon gender, age and education indices 
respectively. Firm Annualized volatility is the dependent variable. All models include year and industry fixed 





percentiles of their cross-sectional distributions.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard 
errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Blau Board Diversity and Firm Annualized Volatility  
  Dependent Variable: Firm Annualized Volatility   
 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Blau Board Diversity Index -0.00239* 
       
 
(-1.83) 
       
Blau Gender Diversity 
  
-0.0418* 
     
   
(-1.54) 
     
Blau Age Diversity 
    
0.0326 
   
     
(1.60) 
   
Blau Education Diversity 
      
-0.0407* 
 
       
(-1.67) 
 






































































































Year Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
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Table 6: Board Diversity and Firm Stock Return Volatility – Continued 
Panel B: Shannon Board Diversity and Firm Annualized Volatility  
  Dependent Variable: Firm Annualized Volatility   
 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
 
Shannon Board Diversity Index -0.00269* 




       
Shannon Gender Index 
  
-0.0634* 
     
   
(-1.56) 
     
Shannon Age Index 
    
0.0494 
   
     
(1.05) 
   
Shannon Education Index 
      
-0.0245* 
 
       
(-1.82) 
 






































































































Year Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   



































  51 
 
Table 7: The Effects of Large Spontaneous Jumps in Board Diversity on Firm Risk 
This table reports the regression estimates of the effects of large increases in board diversity on firm risk. Firm beta 
and annualized volatility are the dependant variables in Panel A and B respectively. Columns (1) and (2) report the 
panel regression estimates where board diversity is measured using Blau and Shannon based composite indices 
respectively. All models include year and industry fixed effects. The definitions of all variables are in Appendix A. 




 percentiles of their cross-sectional distributions.  T-
statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Panel A: Large Spontaneous Jumps in Board Diversity and Firm Beta 
  Dependent Variable: Firm Risk (Beta)   
  (1)   (2)   
Blau Board Diversity Index -0.00431** 
   
 
(-2.52) 
   







































































Year Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   






 Max VIF 1.85  
1.85 
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Table 7: The Effects of Large Spontaneous Jumps in Board Diversity on Firm Risk – 
Continued  
Panel B: Large Spontaneous Jumps in Board Diversity and Firm Annualized Volatility  
  Dependent Variable: Firm Annualized Volatility   
  (1)   (2)   





































































 Year Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   
Industry Fixed Effects Yes  
Yes 
 Observations 2 29,034  
29,034 
 Max VIF 1.85  
1.85 









                                                             
2
 The observations are based on a one year change in the composite board diversity index. Observations with a 
difference greater than one year are dropped. 
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Table 8: The Effects of Large Spontaneous Declines in Board Diversity on Firm Risk 
This table reports the regression estimates of the effects of large decreases in board diversity on firm risk. Firm beta 
and annualized volatility are the dependant variables in Panel A and B respectively. Columns (1) and (2) report the 
panel regression estimates where board diversity is measured using Blau and Shannon based composite indices 
respectively. All models include year and industry fixed effects. The definitions of all variables are in Appendix A. 




 percentiles of their cross-sectional distributions.  T-
statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Panel A: Large Spontaneous Declines in Board Diversity and Firm Beta 
  Dependent Variable: Firm Risk (Beta)   
  (1)   (2)   
Blau Board Diversity Index -0.00456** 
   
 
(-2.64) 
   







































































Year Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   






 Max VIF 1.85  
1.85 
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Table 8: The Effects of Large Spontaneous Declines in Board Diversity on Firm Risk – 
Continued  
Panel B: Large Spontaneous Declines in Board Diversity and Firm Annualized Volatility  
  Dependent Variable: Firm Annualized Volatility 
   (1)   (2)   




































































(-2.28)   
Year Fixed Effects Yes   Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effects Yes  
Yes 
 Observations 3 29,034  
29,034 
 Max VIF 1.85  
1.85 








                                                             
2 The observations are based on a one year change in the composite board diversity index. Observations with a 
difference greater than one year are dropped. 
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Table 9: The Effects of Firms with High Board Diversity Levels 
This table reports the regression estimates of the relationship between firms with high board diversity levels by 
belonging to the upper 20
th
 percentile of the cross-sectional diversity indices distribution and firm risk. Firm beta 
and annualized volatility are the dependant variables in Panel A and B respectively. Columns (1) and (2) report the 
panel regression estimates where board diversity is measured using Blau and Shannon based composite indices 
respectively. All models include year and industry fixed effects. The definitions of all variables are in Appendix A. 




 percentiles of their cross-sectional distributions.  T-
statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Panel A: The Effects of Firms with High Board Diversity Level on Firm Beta  




(2)   
Blau Board Diversity Index -0.00672*** 
   
 
(-3.28) 
   




   
(-2.72) 
 































































Year Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes   












Mean VIF 1.47 
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Table 9: The Effects of Firms with High Board Diversity Levels – Continued 
Panel B: The Effects of Firms with High Board Diversity Level on Firm Annualized Volatility 
  Dependent Variable: Firm Annualized Volatility   
  (1)   (2)   
Blau Board Diversity Index -0.00242* 
   
 
(-1.93) 
   




   
(-1.82) 
 





























































(-3.61)   
















Mean VIF 1.47 
 
1.49   
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Table 10: The Effects of Board Diversity During Financial Crises 
This table reports the regression estimates of the effects of board diversity during financial crises periods. Firm beta 
and annualized volatility are the dependant variables in Panel A and B respectively. Columns (1) and (2) report the 
panel regression estimates where board diversity is measured using Blau and Shannon based composite indices 
respectively. All models include industry fixed effects. The definitions of all variables are in Appendix A. All 




 percentiles of their cross-sectional distributions.  T-statistics 
are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Panel A: The Effects of Board Diversity during Financial Crises Periods on Firm Beta 
  Dependent Variable: Firm Risk (Beta)   
  (1)   (2)   
Blau Board Diversity Index -0.00658*** 
   
 
(-3.59) 
   




   
(-3.58) 
 






































































(-3.08)   
















Mean VIF 1.28 
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Table 10: The Effects of Board Diversity During Financial Crises – Continued 
Panel B: The Effects of Board Diversity during Financial Crises Periods on Firm Annualized Volatility 
  Dependent Variable: Firm Annualized Volatility   
  (1)   (2)   
Blau Board Diversity Index -0.00293** 
   
 
(-2.46) 
   




   
(-2.41) 
 






































































(-3.45)   
















Mean VIF 1.28 
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Table 11: Alternative Measures of Composite Board Diversity and Firm Risk 
This table reports the regression estimates of the effects of board diversity using alternative diversity indices to 
ascertain the validity of the findings. Firm beta and annualized volatility are the dependant variables in Panel A and 
B respectively. Columns (1) and (2) report the panel regression estimates where board diversity is measured using 
Blau and Shannon based composite indices respectively. All models include industry fixed effects. The definitions 




 percentiles of their 
cross-sectional distributions.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors that are 
clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Panel A: Alternative measures of composite Board Diversity and Firm Beta 
  Dependent Variable: Firm Risk (Beta)   
  (1)   (2) 
 





   




   
(-2.32) 
 





















































Year Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes   
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Table 11: Alternative Measures of Composite Board Diversity and Firm Risk – Continued  
Panel B: Alternative measures of composite Board Diversity and Firm Annualized Volatility 
  Dependent Variable: Firm Annualized Volatility    
 
(1)   (2) 
 





   




   
(-1.71) 
 





















































Year Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes   
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition Formula 
Firm Beta 
An estimate of a firm's annual systematic risk (CAPM Beta) obtained using regression 
analysis. 
 
Firm Annualized Volatility 
Square root of 252 multiplied by the standard deviation of each firm's daily stock returns 
from CRSP, used to estimate firm total risk in a given year. 
 
Gender Diversity 
A Blau or Shannon diversity index estimated using the proportion of male and female 
executives on each firm's board in a given year as indicated on BoardEx. 






A Blau or Shannon diversity index estimated using the proportion of executives on each 
firm's board in a given year that belong to five generations based on their respective years 
of birth as indicated on BoardEx. These generations are: The Lost generation, The 
Greatest Generation, Baby Boomers, Generation X and Generation Y outlined in Table 1. 






A Blau or Shannon diversity index estimated using the proportion of executives on each 
firm's board in a given year with highest academic achievements that belong to one of 
five categories. These categories are: less than a Bachelor's degree, Bachelor's degree or 
equivalent, vocational qualifications and professional certifications, Master's degree or 
equivalent, and PhD or beyond outlined in Table 2. 





Board Diversity Index 
A composite board diversity index constructed as six times the sum of the fractional 
quantiles of the Blau or Shannon gender, age and education diversity measures for each 
firm in a given year.  
 
Board Diversity Index 2 
A composite board diversity index constructed as the sum of each firm's Blau or Shannon 
gender, age and education diversity measures in a given year. 
 
Board Size 
The natural logarithm of the number of directors on a firm's board in a given year as 
indicated on BoardEx. 
ln(NumberDirectors) 
Firm Size The natural logarithm of total firm book value of assets (AT) obtained from Compustat. ln(AT) 
Leverage 
The ratio of a firm's total book liabilities (LT) to its total book assets (AT) in a given year 
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Market-to-Book 
The ratio of a firm's market value of equity (MKVALT) to its book value of equity (PRC 




Return on Assets 






A measure of the average number of years that all board members have been with the firm 





A dummy variable equal to 1 when a fiscal year is affected by the financial crisis thus 
exhibiting higher volatility and 0 otherwise. Financial crisis years are: 2008, 2009 and 
2010. 
 
Crisis Diversity Interaction 
The product of a firm's board diversity index and the crisis dummy in each respective 
year. 
 
Index Jump Dummy 
A dummy variable equal to 1 when the change in a firm's board diversity index lies in the 
highest 5% of its cross-sectional distribution and 0 otherwise. 
 
Index Drop Dummy 
A dummy variable equal to 1 when the change in a firm's board diversity index lies in the 
lowest 5% of its cross-sectional distribution and 0 otherwise. 
 
Super Index Dummy 
A dummy variable equal to 1 when a firm's board diversity index lies in the highest 20% 
of its cross-sectional distribution and 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix B. Composite Diversity Index Formulation 
 
  




Quantile 1 Quantile 2 Quantile 3   
Gender Diversity 2 
1
2
 1 -   






 1   






 1   
 





























+ 1) 13 




Firm D 2 2 3 6 × (1 +
2
3
+ 1) 16 
Firm E 2 3 3 6 × (1 + 1 + 1) 18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
